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I. INTRODUCTION
[A] State may regulate the killing and sale of... [migra-
tory] birds, but it does not follow that its authority is exclu-
sive of paramount powers.. .Wild birds are not in the pos-
session of anyone; and possession is the beginning of own-
ership. The whole foundation of the State's rights is the
presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday
had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a
week a thousand miles away.
... Here a national interest of very nearly the first magni-
tude is involved. It can be protected only by a national ac-
tion in concert with that of another power. The subject
matter is only transitorily within the State and has no per-
manent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute
there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with.
We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Gov-
ernment to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the pro-
tectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not
sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is vain, and
were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States
is forbidden to act.
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.l
A. Wetlands as an Invaluable Public Resource
More than half of the wetlands originally contained within the contigu-
ous United States have been destroyed.: The quality of our Nation's water
is integrally linked to the existence and quality of wetlands. This notwith-
standing, enormous pressure to develop wetlands continues unabated. The
flat, low, accessible nature of most wetlands leaves them vulnerable to hu-
man population growth and development. The conversion of wetlands to
pavement and farmland translates to degraded water quality, loss of habitat
for flora and fauna, and economic harm from flooding and the loss of eco-
system services such as water filtration, nutrient cycling, carbon sequestra-
la. B.S., Willamette University, 1998; J.D., University of Montana School of Law, 2005.
1. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,434-435 (1920).
2. EPA, Wetland Restoration, 843-F-01-002e (September 2001), http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/pdf/ restoration.pdf (accessed March 14, 2005).
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tion, and others. Critically, wetlands absorb pollutants such as selenium
(and other heavy metals), sewage, animal waste, road salt, sediment, and
fertilizer.
3
Though nearly seventy-five percent of wetlands are privately owned,4
they contribute substantially to public resource interests including: wildlife
corridors, migratory bird recruitment, biodiversity, water quality, and sus-
tainable water flows. Although wetlands compose only five percent of our
Nation's land area, they harbor thirty-one percent of our Nation's plant spe-
cies.5 Thus, preventing the diminution and degradation of wetlands is a
critical policy goal.
Groundwater and surface water connections link wetlands to interstate
waters of the United States and contribute to water quality at local, regional,
and national spatial scales. Because of this complex connection, quality
wetlands must be maintained in order to ensure clean water, sufficient flood
storage capacity, and overall health for our watersheds.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") defines wetlands as "those areas that are in-
undated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil condi-
tions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar ar-
eas." 6 Under this definition, no surface water need be present for an area to
be considered a wetland by the Corps or EPA. A parcel is a wetland under
EPA regulations so long as the soil is saturated, typical wetland plants
compose the majority of the vegetation, and the soil exhibits hydric (an-
aerobic) characteristics for a minimum duration.
Often, wetlands that flood intermittently or seasonally have both the
highest ecological value as well as the highest human economic value.
Such wetlands have a greater flood storage capacity because they absorb
seasonal floodwater and slowly release it, thereby maintaining water levels
through dry seasons. 7 Often these intermittently or seasonally flooded wet-
lands are isolated wetlands. Isolated wetlands are wetlands not connected
via overland surface water flow to navigable waters and can serve impor-
tant functions. These areas are important breeding areas for migratory
3. EPA, Threats to Wetlands, Report No. 843-F-01-002d (September 2001), http://www.epa.gov/
owow/wetlands/pdf/threats.pdf (accessed May 16, 2005).
4. Id.
5. EPA, Functions and Values of Wetlands, Report No. 843-F-01-002c (September 2001),
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fun-val.pdf (accessed May 16, 2005).
6. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2004).
7. EPA, Types of Wetlands, Report No. 843-F-01-002b (September 2001),
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/types.pdf (accessed May 16, 2005); Ducks Unlimited, In-
creased Flood Storage, http:llwww.ducks.orglconservationlincreased-flood-storage.asp (accessed
April 4, 2005).
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birds, and provide habitat for various other animal and plant species. 8 Iso-
lated wetlands serve important hydrological connections to watersheds that
provide clean and safe water for our use. 9
B. Development of Wetland Regulation
The first congressional attempt to control water pollution began with the
Water Quality Act of 1948 and authorized federal funds for state water pol-
lution control programs. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act ex-
panded these programs in 1956. Because these programs were insufficient
to abate the water pollution problem, Congress enacted the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments, or the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in
1972. to The stated purpose of the Act is to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."' 1 Sec-
tion 404(a) of the CWA regulates the filling or dredging of navigable wa-
ters.12 Thus, the jurisdictional limit of the CWA appears to be waters that
are navigable. The extent of protection afforded to wetlands depends upon
whether the Corps and EPA include wetlands in their definition of "naviga-
ble waters" and whether courts uphold that definition.
The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States, in-
cluding the territorial seas."' 13 The Corps and EPA issued regulations fur-
ther defining "waters of the United States" to include, "waters such as intra-
state lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sand-
flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or
natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce."' 4 Directed by the broad language of the
CWA, the Corps and EPA expanded the traditional concept of navigability
to include waters that are not navigable by any sort of watercraft. Instead,
they consider navigable waters to include wetlands and waterways that may
not even have water at the surface, so long as those waters could affect in-
terstate commerce by influencing traditional navigable waters. The breadth
of the Corps' reach has angered opponents of the agency's federal regula-
tory power as evidenced by the copious litigation on the subject. The
Corps' and EPA's regulations abandoned a connection to navigability alto-
8. Allen E. Plocher, Geoffrey A Levin & Michael V. Miller, Importance of Small Isolated Wet-
lands 2 (March 2003), http://illinois.sierraclub.org/take-actionlinhs.pdf (accessed April 4, 2005).
9. See e.g. Thomas C. Winter & James W. LaBaugh, Hydrologic Considerations in Defining
Isolated Wetlands, 23 Wetlands 532, 532-540 (May 2003). http://www.bioone.org/bioonel?request=get-
document&issn=0277-5212&volume--023&issue=03&page=0532 (accessed April 4, 2005).
10. Robert C. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 576-579 (4"h ed.,
Aspen L & Bus. 2003).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
14. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
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gether, instead relying on the notion of a direct connection to interstate
commerce. 15
The Corps and EPA have employed semantic wrangling to extend their
power as broadly as possible. This manipulation has drawn sharp criticism
from opponents of big government.- The oft-asked question in the inevita-
ble litigation is: "Where does the Corps derive its power to regulate waters
not navigable in any traditional sense?"
C. Federal Authority to Regulate Wetlands
The Constitutional basis for the CWA is the Commerce Clause, which
vests the power to regulate interstate commerce in Congress.' 6 Under the
CWA, the federal government is without power to regulate any water fea-
ture not affected by interstate or foreign commerce.
1. Expansion and Retraction of Federal Commerce Clause Power
The concept of navigability was first relied upon by Mr. Justice Field,
who upheld federal jurisdiction over navigable waters used for transporta-
tion of interstate goods. 17 Since that decision, navigability has been used as
a proper basis for exerting federal jurisdiction over waterways.' 8 However,
prior to 1937, the Court maintained substantial limitations on the Com-
merce Clause power. 9 This trend shifted with President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt's New Deal and resounding reelection in 1936. It had become in-
creasingly apparent to Roosevelt that the U.S. Supreme Court was materi-
ally inhibiting many of his New Deal programs. Under the threat of "pack-
ing the Court" with additional Justices more sympathetic to Roosevelt's big
government paradigm, the Court changed their stance on the breadth of
Commerce Clause power.20 The expansion of federal regulatory authority
perhaps reached its greatest range in 1942, when the Court upheld federal
Commerce Clause power to regulate wheat grown and used only by a
farmer's family. The Court rationalized federal jurisdiction based upon the
substantial aggregate effect of home wheat production and use.2  Accord-
ing to the Court, if every farmer grew and consumed his or her own wheat,
15. Id.
16. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
17. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557,19 L.Ed. 999 (1871).
18. See e.g. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
19. See e.g. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (holding Congress lacks authority
under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of goods manufactured
by child labor in violation of the Child Labor Act); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(holding Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the hours, wages, and other
employment conditions of a national industry).
20. Ronald D. Rotunda, Modem Constitutional Law Cases and Notes 191-192 (7"h Ed., West
Group 2003).
21. See e.g. Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
[Vol. 26
PRIVATE WETLANDS AND PUBLIC VALUES
it would affect interstate wheat commerce.22 Commerce power expanded in
the context of civil rights as well. 3
Presently, commerce authority is articulated in three ways: (1) the chan-
nels of commerce (such as navigable waters); (2) the instrumentalities of
commerce (such as vehicles); and (3) activities that have a "substantial"
relation to interstate commerce (such as the affect of wetland loss on migra-
tory waterfowl). 24 This current articulation has coincided with the in-
creased conservatism of the Court and has resulted in a reinterpretation of
prior precedent and the curtailment of Commerce Clause authority.
25
2. Regulation of Isolated Wetlands under the Commerce Clause
In order for the Corps to regulate wetlands isolated from waters of the
United States, the agency needed to show that isolated wetland use, degra-
dation, or destruction could affect interstate or foreign commerce. For
many years, the Corps accomplished this, in part, with the "Migratory Bird
Rule." This rule was used to claim wetland regulatory jurisdiction over wa-
ter features used (or potentially used) by migratory birds.26 In 2001, the
rule was nullified in the landmark case, Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC).27 In
the wake of SWANCC, federal courts have struggled to determine the reach
of the Corps' wetland jurisdiction under section 404(a) of the Clean Water
Act.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF WETLAND REGULATION
To what extent should the federal government be able to regulate activi-
ties affecting public health and welfare on private property under the aus-
pices of the CWA? The resolution of this issue will likely determine the
extent to which the federal government can regulate private activities af-
fecting water resources, including wetlands. When resolved, the reach of
federal jurisdiction will greatly influence the quality of our watersheds and
will affect habitat conservation, biodiversity, recreational opportunities,
economic development, agriculture, individual rights, federal constitutional
22. Id.
23. See e.g. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding the Commerce Clause may be
used to regulate discrimination in motels where interstate guests stay); and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964) (finding the Commerce Clause may be used to halt racial discrimination by restaurants
solely based on the fact that slightly under half the food served originates outside the state in which the
restaurant operates).
24. See e.g. U.S. v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549,558 (1995) (citations omitted).
25. See e.g. Lopez at 561 (holding Congress could not prohibit possession of firearms within school
zones, as this is a traditional state police power issue); U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000)
(finding Congress may not regulate non-economic violent criminal conduct based solely on that con-
duct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce).
26. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
27. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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power-and perhaps most importantly-the jurisdictional boundaries of
other federal environmental laws.
A. SWANCC
SWANCC evolved from a dispute over whether the Corps had jurisdic-
tion to regulate the filling of an abandoned sand and gravel pit found to be
"non-adjacent' to any navigable, water. The site satisfied the Corps' juris-
28dictional criteria as a wetland under the Migratory Bird Rule, and was
purchased by a group of suburban Chicago municipalities to be used as a
landfill for non-hazardous waste. 29 Though the Corps initially declined
jurisdiction and informed the municipalities they would not need a permit,
it changed its position after learning migratory waterfowl frequented the
site.
As previously noted, section 404 demands the Corps regulate all "navi-
gable waters" which are defined at section 502(7) as "waters of the United
States., 30 The Corps interprets these waters to include "waters such as in-
trastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or
natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce., 31 Under these rules, the Corps subse-
quently interpreted its jurisdiction broadly, to include wetlands not con-
nected to navigable water via surface flow. 32
To implement Congress' broad intent, the Corps used the "Migratory
Bird Rule," (MBR) which maintained jurisdiction over waters isolated from
navigable waters via surface connections that provide habitat for migratory
birds. 33 The MBR extended wetland regulatory jurisdiction to isolated wet-
lands, where no surface connection to a "navigable water" was obvious.
The MBR provided protection to isolated waters and wetlands: "(a) which
are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Trea-
ties; or (b) which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds
which cross State lines; or (c) which are or would be used as habitat for
endangered species; or (d) used 'to irrigate crops sold in interstate com-
merce." 
3 4
The Corps' wetland regulatory jurisdiction was upheld at the Northern
District Court of Illinois and at the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, but
was overturned by the United States Supreme Court.35 In an attempt to
28. Id. at 162.
29. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162-63.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
31. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
32. Sen. Conf. Rpt. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 3668, 3822).
33. See e.g. 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (1986).
34. Id. Since SWANCC, no efforts have been made by the Corps to exert jurisdiction in situations
concerning endangered species or irrigated crops.
35. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
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distinguish prior binding precedent holding the term "navigable" was "of
limited import,",36 the Court explained its prior holding was dependant upon
a "significant nexus" between the wetland in question and a more tradi-
tional interpretation of "navigable water., 37 The Court stated that allowing
the Corps to "claim jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the
"Migratory Bird Rule" would result in significant impingement of the
States' traditional and primary power over land and water use. 38 The ma-
jority denied Chevron deference to the agency with the foreboding warning
that an administrative interpretation of a statute that raises serious constitu-
tional problems will be denied deference and construed to avoid such prob-
lems unless the construction is plainly contrary to intent of Congress.3 9 The
Court, in a five to four decision, held that "33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3) (1999), as
clarified and applied to petitioner's [fill] site pursuant to the "Migratory
Bird Rule," 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (1986), exceeds the authority granted to
[the Corps] under § 404(a) of the Clean Water Act."40
The Court's holding in SWANCC created a stir among wetland stake-
holders. Real estate developers imagined profits would grow because they
would not have to undergo the expensive permitting and mitigation process
under section 404(a) for developing isolated wetlands. Conservationists
cringed as highly valuable, yet non-adjacent, wetlands would now be left to
sub-standard state laws or incentive-based federal programs for protection.
Both sides of the issue did not miss the implied message broadcast by the
Court; federal regulatory authority over environmental issues would be
curtailed and isolated wetlands would now be sacrificed to support more
conservative notions of "small" federal government. The once invincible
and formidable top-down regulation of the 1970s was ready to be win-
nowed down in the name of states' rights. The majority made known their
sympathy for private economic gain despite the negative environmental
externalities forced upon the public. Additionally, the new "significant
nexus" test was ill-defined and ambiguous. Along with the legal reasoning
behind the decision, the actual consequences of SWANCC were unclear.
B. Courts Interpreting SWANCC
Federal courts are split in their understanding of how much "reigning-in"
of Corps' authority was intended by the SWANCC majority. Some courts
interpret the holding more broadly and have found most isolated wetlands
36. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 (1985).
37. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
38. Id. at 174.
39. Id. at 173; See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 842-844 (1984) (holding deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute will be granted by a
court when Congress has not specifically spoken to the issue in the statute, the statute is ambiguous, and
the statute is not arbitrary and capricious).
40. Id. at 174.
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to fall outside of federal jurisdiction. Other courts have interpreted
SWANCC more narrowly, provided they can establish a nexus between a
more isolated water and a navigable waterway. In determining whether to
uphold the Corps' jurisdiction post-SWANCC, the court must determine if
the MBR was the sole basis for jurisdiction.
To shed some light, courts may look to the first landmark Supreme Court
case regarding the Corps' jurisdiction, United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc.41 The Riverside Court determined that although some waters
would not be "navigable" under the classical definition of the term, so long
as they were adjacent to a jurisdictional water of the United States, the ad-
jacent waters would receive federal protection. 42 In Riverside, all nine jus-
tices held the Corps acted reasonably in claiming section 404(a) jurisdiction
over wetlands abutting a navigable waterway. 43 In so doing, the Court
noted that the term navigable was of limited import and that Congress had
evidenced its intent to "regulate at least some waters that would not be
deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term. ' 44
In a five to four decision, the Court in SWANCC stated "[tlhe term 'navi-
gable' has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as
its authority for enacting the [CWA]: its traditional jurisdiction over waters
that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so
made. 45  Riverside implied a broad reach of the Corps' jurisdiction;
SWANCC, in a cursory dismissal of Justice White's legal reasoning, nar-
rowed it. Courts are left to delineate where upon the continuum the Corps'
jurisdiction actually rests.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used SWANCC to further
limit the Corps' jurisdiction, while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and the majority of other U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, inter-
preted SWANCC narrowly.46
In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., the Fifth Circuit applied SWANCC
broadly.47 In Rice, the defendant damaged the plaintiffs land and was sued
under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). OPA uses the CWA definition "waters
of the U.S" for its jurisdictional basis, making it relevant to questions of
jurisdictional reach under the CWA. Holding for the defendant, the Rice
court observed that, under SWANCC, "it appears that a body of water is
subject to regulation under the [CWA] if the body of water is actually navi-
gable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water. ' 48
41. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
42. Id. at 133.
43. Id. at 139.
44. Id. at 133.
45. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
46. United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Center, Inc., 2002 WL 360652 at *5 (N.D. I11., Mar. 8,
2002).
47. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5h Cir. 2001).
48. Id. at 269.
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The Fifth Circuit held that "a body of water is subject to regulation under
[the CWA] if the body of water is actually navigable or is adjacent to an
open body of navigable water. 4 9 Despite stating that adjacent water is sub-
ject to regulation, the Fifth Circuit determined that contaminated groundwa-
ter, later found in a traditionally navigable waterway, was not subject to
regulation as it was not per se adjacent to a navigable water.5° This literal
interpretation of the definition of navigable water suggests that waters
within the Corps' jurisdiction must be navigable or adjacent to navigable
water via a readily observable surface connection. Unlike Riverside, the
Fifth Circuit did not give "limited import" to the term "navigable." The
Fifth Circuit emphasized the term "navigable" in a traditional sense, taking
the literal interpretation of the term to the extreme-well beyond the
SWANCC Court's analysis of that term in the context of hydrologically
isolated wetlands.
By focusing on what is "actually navigable," the Fifth Circuit did not fur-
ther the stated purpose of the CWA-protecting the integrity of our Na-
tion's waters. In addition, the court discounted the guidance from Congress
as to how the term should be defined (i.e., any waters of the U.S. and the
territorial seas).51 Rather than focusing on the actual connection between
oil-contaminated water and undisputed navigable waters, the Fifth Circuit
focused on the traditional meaning of the term navigable. The practical
result of this holding (in the Fifth Circuit at least) appears to be that one
party may pollute groundwater affecting another's property with impunity
even in the face of clear evidence of an underground hydrologic connection.
Thus, the CWA affords little protection for isolated wetlands in the Fifth
Circuit.
The majority of courts deciding the issue use a much narrower interpreta-
tion of SWANCC than the Fifth Circuit. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irriga-
tion Dist. involved a citizen suit filed against an irrigation district's use of
herbicide to remove vegetation obstructing irrigation ditches without first
obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit.52 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court for
the State of Oregon and found the irrigation canals to be "waters of the
U.S." under the CWA. The court concluded irrigation canals that "ex-
change water with ... natural streams and at least one lake" are tributaries
because they contribute flows to a larger stream or body of water. It also
concluded that their decision was "not affected by the Supreme Court's
recent limitation on the meaning of "navigable waters" in SWANCC. 54 Irri-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
52. 243 F.3d 526, 528 (9" Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 533.
54. Id.
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gation canals that "exchange water" with undisputed waters of the U.S. are
not "isolated waters" such as the ponds at issue in SWANCC.55 This lan-
guage shows the tack taken most often by environmental plaintiffs and
courts holding in their favor. The language perhaps illustrates the notion of
"adjacency" to navigable waters, but avoids the issue of isolation alto-
gether. In so doing, courts avoid the constitutional entrapments articulated
by the SWANCC majority.56
The artificially created irrigation ditch in Headwaters was jurisdictional
because it exchanged water with natural streams. 57 Though the irrigation
ditch flowed intermittently and was not "navigable in the classic sense" it
was integrally, albeit tangentially, connected to waters that were naviga-
ble.58  Following Riverside and SWANCC, Headwaters determined that
jurisdiction existed when a "significant nexus" to a navigable water of the
United States could reasonably be described as "adjacent., 59 Significantly,
however, no court has relied strictly on a connection to interstate commerce
post-SWANCC.
In reaching these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit relied on several pre-
SWANCC decisions from other circuits, evidencing their view of the limited
nature of SWANCC. 6C The Headwaters court correctly analyzed the ulti-
mate questions when determining CWA jurisdiction: (1) whether the water
feature at issue is connected to navigable waters and (2) whether the navi-
gable waters could be affected by harm to the water feature. In expanding
the reach of federal jurisdiction under the CWA, Headwaters acknowledges
an often disregarded, but critical point; wetlands hydrologically connected
to jurisdictional waters of the United States have a substantial effect on the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the quality of the nation's
water.
HI. VIABILITY OF USING ADJACENT HYDROLOGIC CONNECTIONS TO FILL
THE GAP LEFT BY THE INVALIDATION OF (AT LEAST PART OF) THE
MIGRATORY BIRD RULE
Without the ability to regulate wetlands based strictly on a connection to
interstate commerce through the MBR, the Corps is left with a gap to fill
with regard to how isolated wetlands can be regulated. One idea is to ex-
55. Id.
56. See e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 397 (6th Cir. 1984).
57. Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 533.
58. Id..
59. Lamplight at *6.
60. Headwaters, 243 F.3d. at 533. The Ninth Circuit cited the following cases in Headwaters:
United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (11th Cir.1997) (tributaries are "waters of the United
States," and manmade ditches and canals that flow intermittently into creek may be tributaries); United
States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 764 (2d Cir.1999) (non-navigable tributaries flowing into navigable
streams are "waters of the United States"); United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347
(10th Cir. 1979) (unnamed tributary of creek that is tributary to river is "water of the United States").
[Vol. 26
PRIVATE WETLANDS AND PUBLIC VALUES
pand the interpretation of "adjacent" to include hydrological connections
based on groundwater and aquifers.
A. Historical Approach to Corps Jurisdiction Supports Including Hydro-
logical Groundwater Connections Within the Significant Nexus Test
It is dubious that courts must reconcile a long history of contradictory
holdings in order to allow jurisdiction based on a hydrologic groundwater
connection. In United States v. GAF Corp., EPA was denied injunctive
relief against a corporation seeking to inject waste into deep sub-surface
wells only two years after the CWA was enacted. 61 The court denied in-
junctive relief because it did not consider groundwater to be "navigable"
and therefore, not a "water of the United States. 62 Notably, however, GAF
was decided under the Corps' original and unenthusiastic interpretation of
"navigable" under the CWA, prior to the 1977 amendments, and without
the edifying dicta provided by Riverside (1985).63 With Corps' regulations
failing to comport with the statutory purpose of the CWA, EPA was in a
powerless position. Thus, EPA had no jurisdiction to regulate groundwater
under the Clean Water Act. 64 The court reasoned EPA lacked regulatory
authority because Congress had rejected an amendment to the CWA which
would have specifically granted federal jurisdiction over groundwater.65
Shortly after GAF, new regulations were adopted.
Following GAF, the Fifth Circuit rejected EPA jurisdiction over ground-
water affected by waste injection into deep sub-surface wells.66 In Exxon
Corp. v. Train, the court followed the same reasoning as the GAF court, but
went further to determine that conditioning NPDES permits to effectively
prohibit sub-surface discharges was beyond the authority of the Administra-
tor and "contrary to congressional intentions. 67 In Village of Oconomowoc
Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit
relied on Exxon to conclude that "waters of the United States" do not in-
clude groundwater, even when the groundwater is hydrologically connected
61. United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
62. GAF, 389 F. Supp. at 1383.
63. For a brief discussion of the history of the Corps regulations regarding navigability See e.g.
SWANCC at 160. See also John D. Ostergren, SWANCC in Duck Country: Will Court-Ordered Devolu-
tion Fill the Prairie Potholes?, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 381 (2003) for a more in depth history of Corps
cooperation with the CWA.
64. GAF, 389 F.Supp. at 1383.
65. Id. at 1383-4. Aside, Chief Justice Rehnquist opining in SWANCC, rejected Congressional
rejection of legislation as a showing of Congressional intent. '"[F]ailed legislative proposals are 'a
particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.' A bill can be pro-
posed for any number of reasons, and it can be Tejeced for just as man-ibem. The ia1CvmMbp be-
tween the actions and inactions of the 95th Congress and the intent of the 92d Congress in passing §
404(a) is also considerably attenuated. Because 'subsequent history is less illuminating than the contem-
poraneous evidence....' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170.
66. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 55A F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 1322.
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to navigable waters or their tributaries.68  In so holding, the court relied
heavily on the Senate Committee on Public Works' conclusion that
groundwater regulation was beyond the scope of the CWA. 69 Even though
Riverside had been decided and ostensibly applied, the Seventh Circuit
dismissed it without analysis in Village of Oconomowoc Lake.7° Addition-
ally, the Seventh Circuit ignored their previous holding in Exxon, finding
that EPA could regulate groundwater hydrologically connected to surface
water.71
The better-reasoned cases recognize hydrologically connected groundwa-
ter as being within the CWA's reach.72 It is important to note that GAF and
Exxon were decided before Riverside. Further, Village of Oconomowoc
Lake lacked any thorough discussion of Riverside. In Riverside, the Su-
preme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that
wetlands, insufficiently flooded by adjacent navigable waters to support
hydrophytic (aquatic) vegetation, were outside the limits of the Corps' ju-
risdiction.73 Here, the Sixth Circuit attempted to limit the Corps' jurisdic-
tion to wetlands directly connected to navigable water. Under this ruling
there could be no break between the jurisdictional feature and the wetland;
adjacency was interpreted very strictly. Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the
Supreme Court implied wetlands hydrologically connected to navigable
waters were jurisdictional, even when separated by areas considered to be
without wetland characteristics. The Court reasoned that "the term 'navi-
gable' was of limited import," and that Congress intended to regulate wet-
lands "inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of the United States. 74 This
language implies that wetlands connected to jurisdictional waters by inter-
mittent surface flow, seasonal flooding, or groundwater were sufficiently
"adjacent" to be jurisdictional. So long as groundwater is "inseparably
bound up with the 'water' of the United States," it is within the scope of the
Clean Water Act.75 It is axiomatic to assert that groundwater is often bound
up with surface waters, and it logically follows that Congress intended for
such groundwater to be within the regulatory reach of the Clean Water Act
and the Corps.
SWANCC did not overrule Riverside's holding; in fact, SWANCC af-
firmed Riverside's holding.76 While agreeing the term "navigable waters"
was not to be taken literally-and should have "limited effect"-the Court
68. Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 964-95.
71. United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977).
72. See e.g., Thomas L. Casey, Reevaluating "Isolated Waters": Is Hydrologically Connected
Groundwater "Navigable Water" Under the Clean Water Act?, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 159, 169 n. 97 (2002).
73. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 397 (6th Cir. 1984).
74. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133-34.
75. Id.
76. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
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stated "it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give
it no effect whatever." 77 The SWANCC Court further stated that Corps'
jurisdiction did not extend to wetlands not adjacent to-and with no "sig-
nificant nexus" to-navigable waters of the United States.78 In so doing,
the Court upheld Riverside and the requirement of a "significant nexus" to
navigable waters. However, the SWANCC decision ignored the careful and
copious reasoning the Riverside Court used to reach its conclusion.
Technically, the only damage to federal jurisdictional power was the
overruling of the "Migratory Bird Rule." The Court considered the wetland
at issue to be isolated from any navigable water. For this reason, the five-
member majority believed that the Corps was overstepping the bounds of
the CWA, and implicitly, the Commerce Clause. 79 The majority believed it
was upholding the right reserved solely to the states to govern the use of
their own resources by limiting jurisdiction that seemed incongruous with
the Tenth Amendment.8°
The holding in SWANCC leaves many questions unanswered. How does
regulating wetlands, confined to single states and isolated from any naviga-
ble water, further the purposes of the Clean Water Act? Why-given the
direct congressional mandate that navigable waters are to include all "wa-
ters of the U.S."-does the Court interpret the CWA so narrowly? Is
groundwater or isolated surface water no longer "waters of the U.S?" How
did the Corps determine that migratory birds are strongly associated with
economic interstate commerce? Aside from obvious connections such as
international treaties, tourism, bird-watching, and hunting, the answers to
these questions are found within the Clean Water Act's underlying pur-
poses.
B. Interpreting the Underlying Policy of the Clean Water Act Promotes the
Expansion of "Adjacent" Wetlands Under the Act
Notably, the term "navigable," and its association with commerce, comes
from the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.81 The stated purpose of the Act
was to "promote water transportation and commerce., 82 This purpose is far
removed from that of the Clean Water Act: to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. 83
"Whether pollution is introduced by a visible, above-ground conduit or
77. Id. at 172.
78. Id. at 167-68.
79. Id. at 173.
80. Id. at 174.
81. Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403(13) (1899); see also SWANCC 531 U.S. at 177 (Ste-
vens J. dissenting).
82. Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water Policy and the Evolu-
tion of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. Rev. 873, 877 (1993).
83. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132 (quoting Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. §
1251 (1972)).
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enters the surface water through the aquifer matters little to the fish, water-
fowl, and recreational users which are affected by the degradation of our
nation's rivers and streams. 84
The main impetus behind the enactment of the CWA had nothing to do
with the idea of ensuring that our Nation's rivers would remain navigable
for generations to come. Rather, the purpose is illustrated by the 1969 fire
on the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, caused by a massive slick of industrial
waste.85 The CWA's noble goal was to halt all water pollution by the year
1985.6 With that in mind, it seems incongruous for the Supreme Court to
conclude that Congress was limiting the reach of regulatory authority to
rivers that were, in fact, "navigable."
Justice Stevens' dissent in SWANCC, argues the "major purpose" of the
CWA was "to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimina-
tion of water pollution.,8 7  Furthermore, Stevens noted that Justice
Rehnquist (who wrote the majority opinion in SWANCC) stated that "[n]o
Congressman's remarks on the [CWA] were complete without reference to
[its] 'comprehensive' nature." 88 It is unlikely that Congress intentionally
enacted the most "comprehensive" water pollution control in American
history, but simultaneously limited the Act's regulatory authority to surface
water only. To do so would disregard the well-known effects that ground-
water pollution can and does have on interstate waters.
Unfortunately, the circuit courts remain split on this issue. The split per-
haps stems from improper quantification and presentation of environmental
harms and the acceptance of this "science" by development-friendly judges.
A particularly relevant anecdote to this hypothesis occurred on January 15,
2003, when the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey limited
the Corps' jurisdiction under § 404(a). In FD & P Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, the court narrowly denied summary judgment to
a freight company wishing to fill a portion of the New Jersey Meadowlands
in order to construct a facility to move freight from trains to trucks.89
In this case the wetlands in question "drain[ed] into Penhorn Creek,
which flows into the Hackensack River one mile away from the wet-
lands." 90 In other words, a direct surface water connection existed between
the wetlands in question and a navigable interstate waterway. Despite this
connection, FD & P's expert witness asserted that the wetlands did not pro-
vide any environmental benefits to interstate waters, and by building the
facility, they would improve water quality without losing the ability to con-
84. Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 (D. Idaho 2001).
85. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
87. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
89. FD & P Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F.Supp.2d 509, 510-511
(2003).
90. Id. at 517.
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trol flooding.91 To build their facility, FD &P planned to fill 53.5 acres of
the approximate total of 77.0 acres of wetland on its property.92
The science behind FD & P's expert conclusions is contrary to the ac-
cepted status quo. EPA notes that suspended sediment settles more quickly
when filtered by wetlands. 93 Wetlands utilize nutrients contained in fertil-
izer, manure, septic tank discharges, and municipal sewage by absorbing
them through plant roots and microorganisms in the soil. 94 Often, these
pollutants stick to soil particles. 95 This filtration process removes much of
the water's nutrient and pollutant load by the time it leaves a wetland.96
With this in mind, the expert's conclusion that the wetlands in question "do
not provide any environmental benefits" is-at best---curious.
The FD & P expert concluded that "placement of fill will actually en-
hance the water quality.. .because FD & P plans to install.. .basins... which
will trap sediment from the FD & P property. 97 The very fact that FD & P
was compelled to mitigate the wetland loss by installing a catch basin and
storm-water retention facility suggests that filling the wetland would ad-
versely affect sediment and storm water flow into navigable waters.
Finally, FD & P's expert concluded that because the property is in the
lowest point of the Meadowlands watershed, the wetlands did not provide
any flood storage capacity. 98 Curious science indeed. Filling the lowest
point of a watershed is analogous to dropping a rock into a full glass of
water. If you displace the water at the bottom with a rock, it spills over the
rim of the glass. Unsound analysis such as that FD & P employed has led
to billions of dollars of needless damage and loss of life during periods of
flooding. 99 An acre of wetland can store one to one and a-half million gal-
lons of floodwater, 100 here FD & P wanted to fill 53.5 acres. At this point,
one may safely cast doubt upon the expert's conclusions.
When judges are supplied with such misleading information, it is under-
standable that the strength of the CWA is impinged. Judges are typically
too busy to adequately self-educate themselves on esoteric matters like wet-
land science.
Considering the variety of cases our courts are expected to oversee, we
cannot expect them to be experts at everything. Predictably, the Court in
FD & P stated "[in] light of [SWANCC] this Court was strongly tempted to
91. Id.
92. Id. at 511.
93. EPA, Functions and Values of Wetlands, Report No. 843-F-01-002c (September 2001),
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlards/facts/fun-val.pdf (accessed May 16, 2005).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. FD & P, 239 F.Supp.2d at 517.
98. ld..
99. EPA, Functions and Values of Wetlands, Report No. 843-F-01-002c (September 2001),
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetiands/facts/fun-val.pdf (accessed May 16, 2005).
100. Id.
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grant summary judgment in favor of FD & P. If, as FD & P asserts, the
filling of the wetlands will not be detrimental to the Hackensack River, then
there is no substantial nexus, and therefore no [CWA] jurisdiction."' 0'1
In making this assertion, the Court concluded that the SWANCC decision
redefined the meaning of "navigable waters."' 0 2 They went on to say that
"it is the view of this Court that the 'hydrological connection' test is no
longer the valid mode of analysis. In this context, the language of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion is instructive-it is 'the significant nexus be-
tween the wetlands and 'navigable waters" that must inform our reading of
the CWA."' 03 The court determined that a "significant nexus" must consti-
tute more than a mere "hydrological connection."°4
One obvious problem with the aforementioned conclusion is that it un-
dermines the stated purpose of the Clean Water Act. If a wetland is
"merely connected" via surface water (much less groundwater) to a naviga-
ble water (i.e., not a significant nexus under FD & P), the navigable water
can be equally and even more damaged than if it were connected via sur-
face water (i.e., a significant nexus under FD & P). This test cripples regu-
latory agency authority to scientifically evaluate the potential damage to our
Nation's water under the CWA by replacing sound science with semantics
and politics. This is illustrative of substandard reasoning undertaken by
courts bestowing too much weight to SWANCC. Rather than focusing on
the obvious surface connection between the wetlands at issue and the Hack-
ensack River, the FD & P court focused on whether the filling of wetlands
would be detrimental. Regulatory agencies should determine whether the
filling of wetlands is detrimental to navigable waters. It is in instances like
this, where courts would be wise to grant deference to agencies as directed
in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 105
Many factors affect whether damage to navigable waters occurs through
a hydrological connection. Depending on soil permeability, contaminated
water can flow at highly variable rates. It is often the case that groundwater
exerts a far greater influence on the "chemical, physical, and biological
integrity" of the Nation's waters than surface waters. 1 6 A mere hydrologi-
cal connection can be a very "significant nexus" to a navigable water.
Admittedly, the hydrological connection between the gravel pit wetlands
and a navigable river in SWANCC was marginal at best. And in such a con-
text, Chief Justice Rehnquist can hardly be blamed for taking the opportu-
nity to ascend the soapbox and instruct us upon the dangers of over-broad
regulations. Unfortunately, the result was over-broad curtailment of regula-
101. FD & P, 239 F.Supp.2d at 517.
102. Id. at 516.
103. Id. (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168).
104. id. at 516.
105. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
106. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132 (quoting Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. §
1251 (1972)).
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tions. Despite this, hydrologic connections are frequently more obvious
than those in SWANCC. Often the wetlands that will be sacrificed to FD&P
like interpretation of SWANCC's "significant nexus" test will not be aban-
doned gravel pits, but prairie potholes, vernal pool mosaics, alpine meadow
wetlands, and myriad other classifications of functional wetlands.
10 7
The CWA reflects a paradigm shift from protecting waters solely on the
basis of keeping rivers free of debris for transportation, to protecting water-
shed health in order to protect our own. In his SWANCC dissent, Justice
Stevens noted CWA represented a "shift in the focus of federal water regu-
lation from protecting navigability toward environmental protection."'1
0 8
Therefore, Congress was right when it "defined 'navigable waters' as 'wa-
ters of the United States,' essentially delete[ing] the navigability require-
ment from the statute. ''U9
Scientifically speaking, it is well reasoned that wetlands with ascertain-
able hydrological connections to navigable waters should fall within the
Corps' jurisdiction, even when examined under the "significant nexus" test.
If not, many functional and valuable wetlands would be destroyed because
the MBR has been overruled. The MBR extended CWA protection to wet-
lands associated with isolated groundwater supplies. In actuality, "isolated"
groundwater is the source of drinking water for a vast percentage of the
American population; the stated purpose of the CWA is "restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."'" 0 By limiting our protection to wetlands (with a significant nexus) to
navigable waters and excluding all others-regardless of the value of these
superficially isolated waters-we seem to have failed to grasp the full intent
of the CWA. At present, we are protecting less than the bare minimum.
The CWA was enacted in a political era where environmental protection
was a higher priority. Nonetheless, the statutory mandate has not been al-
tered. We are not restoring and maintaining the integrity of our waters, we
are simply slowing their degradation. By striking the Corps' authority un-
der the "Migratory Bird Rule," the Supreme Court has subverted the pur-
pose of the Clean Water Act.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE DEFINITION OF NAVIGABLE
WATERS AND "THE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES?"
Section 404 regulates the discharge of fill material into "navigable wa-
ters."' 1 To ascertain the meaning of the term "navigable waters," one must
first look to the statute itself. The statute defines navigable waters as "the
107. See generally EPA, Types of Wetlands, Report No. 943-F-01-002b (September 2001),
http:l/www.epa.gov/owow/wetlandslpdfltypes.pdf (accessed May 16, 2005).
108. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179.
109. Id. at 182.
110. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972)).
111. 33U.S.C. § 1344(a).
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waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."' 12 "[T]he waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas" is not further defined in
the text of the CWA. Nonetheless, the meaning of the phrase is ascertain-
able using the canons of statutory construction.
First, courts look to the generally understood and accepted meaning of
the words.1 13 "The" is defined as a word "[u]sed before a singular noun,
making it generic." ' 14 Generic is defined as "relating to or descriptive of an
entire group or class; general.""' 5 Thus, the use of the term "the" before
"waters" implies waters in general or the entire group of waters.
Next we must ask: What are waters in general? Waters is defined as "[a]
clear, colorless, odorless, and tasteless liquid, H20, essential for most plant
and animal life and the most widely used of all solvents." Notably, the
plain, ordinary, and natural meaning of the term "waters" is not limited to
"adjacent" waters, navigable waters, or even surface waters. The term,
given its plain meaning, means the entire group of waters out there, or all
waters.
Tenets of statutory construction require seemingly ambiguous provisions
to be read holistically to further the substantive purpose of the statutory
scheme. 16 The stated purpose of the CWA is to "restore and maintain...the
Nation's waters" and "it is a national goal.. .to provide for the protection
and propagation of fish.. .and wildlife."'"17 Consistency with these goals
requires waters to be interpreted in a manner that restores waters and pro-
vides for fish and wildlife. Logically, these goals would best be furthered
by an expansive interpretation of the term "waters."
To further extrapolate the meaning of statutory terms, words modifying
terms may also be considered. 118  Here, navigable waters are limited to
those waters "of the United States, including the territorial seas." 119
Plainly, the United States refers to a geographical location or expanse of
territory. This understanding is bolstered by the reference to "territorial"
seas; the Congress was likely contemplating the concept of geographic ter-
ritory when drafting this legislation. Thus, we can understand the definition
of navigable waters to include all groups of waters within the geographic
boundaries of United States territory. This too leads to the conclusion that
112. 33 C.F.R. § 1362(7).
113. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S.Ct. 377, 382 (2004)("When interpreting a statute, we must give
words their "ordinary or natural" meaning").
114. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1333 (41h ed., Houghton Mifflin Co.,
2000).
115. Id.
116. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 125 S.Ct. 460,467 (2004).
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. Notably, this section does not limit the stated purpose to navigable waters,
but waters in general, suggesting an all inclusive definition of waters. Additionally, water quality is
specifically mentioned, rather than navigable water quality.
118. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 125 S.Ct. 694, 701 (2005).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
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an expansive context be applied, and navigable waters include groundwater,
surface water, and even isolated surface water.
So why then would the SWANCC Court hold the opposite of a strict tex-
tual interpretation of statutory language? The Court's "navigable waters"
jurisprudence provides puzzling contradiction. 20  Though the entire Court
in Riverside found the term ambiguous enough to look beyond the statutory
language, the SWANCC Court failed to so investigate. The reasons for so
doing sound more in politics than legal reasoning. To reach their decision,
the Court used a fair rule of statutory construction, that is, where two mean-
ings could reasonably apply, choose the meaning with fewer Constitutional
implications.12 1 However here, such a construction was inappropriate. In-
stead of giving "navigable waters" its congressionally mandated statutory
meaning, the Court pulled a new rule out of its canon and used the word
being defined to define its definition. Though "waters of the U.S." defines
"navigable waters," the Court uses "navigable waters to define "waters of
the U.S." Through this syllogistic trickery, the Court reinserted a require-
ment of literal navigability-all while overriding congressional authority,
their binding precedent, and effectively legislating from the bench.
V. NOTIONS OF FEDERALISM AND MIGRATORY BIRDS
Distilled, the debate over the reach of Corps' jurisdiction focuses on fed-
eralism. The agencies, following the reasoning articulated in Riverside, and
desiring to further the purpose of the CWA, seek to assert the broadest
reach under the CWA. Developers and other stakeholders articulate com-
pelling anecdotal arguments that the reach of the Corps is far overbroad and
the regulations too cumbersome.1
These conflicting policies face-off in the prolific litigation arising from
the jurisdictional debate. z3  The debate culminates in front of the Court
where Chief Justice Rehnquist, defender against the hydra-headed federal
120. See e.g. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-75 (discussing the "outer limits" of Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause stating that the MBR raises "significant constitutional questions" and
without a "clear statement from Congress" that it intended section 404 to be interpreted expansively, the
Court had to construe the waters narrowly to avoid possible constitutional problems). But see Riverside,
474 U.S. at 133 (citing Sen. Rpt. 92-414, at 77 (1972) & H.R. Rpt. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131
(1972)) (citing a clear statement from Congress that it "demanded broad federal authority").
121. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
122. SWANCC at 174. ("These are significant constitutional questions raised by respondents' appli-
cation of their regulations, and yet we find nothing approaching a clear statement from Congress that it
intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit such as we have here. Permitting respon-
dents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the "Migratory Bird Rule"
would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and
water use."). See also FD & P Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F.Supp.2d 509,
517 (2003) ("In light of [SWANCC], this court was strongly tempted to grant summary judgment in
favor of FD & P. If, as FD & P asserts, the filling of the wetlands will not be detrimental to the Hack-
ensack River, then there is no substantial nexus, and therefore no CWA jurisdiction.").
123. For an exhaustive comparison of courts determining jurisdiction under the CWA See e.g. 160
A.L.R.Fed. 585 (2000).
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government, lops CWA jurisdiction off at the neck. Triumphantly, devel-
opers race by the stunned monster, fill the wetlands, and park their cars
atop, meanwhile pocketing the money they may have spent on wetland
mitigation. As a result, the public foots the bill for the lost value of the
wetland and pays more to treat water, control flooding and reclamation,
protect endangered species and greenspace, as well as incurring a myriad of
other negative externalities.
Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly instances where exerting broad ju-
risdiction appears unfair to an individual businessperson. Yet, deciding the
severity of wetland impacts and how to mitigate is the purview of Congress
and the regulatory agencies, not the courts. Considering the cumulative
effect upon the Nation's wetlands and the continued net loss in acreage and
value, even before SWANCC, the benefits outweigh the costs. 124
Possibly, the Supreme Court did not understand the public importance of
isolated wetlands. Wetlands provide recreational value for approximately
two million waterfowl hunters who spent approximately $638 million in
1980.125 The prairie pothole region of Minnesota, North Dakota, eastern
Montana, and South Dakota accounts for more than 50 percent of the water-
fowl production in the United States. 26  This prairie pothole region is
named for the individually isolated wetlands scattered throughout the re-
gion that create a wetland mosaic. Frequently, there is no hydrological sur-
face connection between them; though it has been argued that the entire
region is hydrologically connected.1 27  Looking merely at the economic
boon resulting from waterfowl hunting from North Dakota to Louisiana of
birds born in the isolated potholes, one can say isolated wetlands substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.
In the wake of SWANCC there may yet be something left to 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3). The Court left the jurisdictional issue to the lower courts. The
EPA and Corps, in the final days of the Clinton Administration, adopted a
narrow interpretation of the case. 2 They interpreted the case to mean that
124. See Ostergren, supra n. 63 (stating section 404, even prior to SWANCC, was ineffective in
maintaining wetland acreage and functional values).
125. Harold A. Kantrud et al., U.S. Geological Survey, Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Center,
Prairie Basin Wetlands of the Dakotas: A Community Profile § 5.1 (Sept. 1989),
http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/othrdata/basinwet/basinwet/chap5a.htm (updated July 16, 1997)
(accessed November 18, 2004) (internal citations omitted).
126. Ducks Unlimited, Ducks Unlimited Annual Report 2001 4, http://www.ducks.org/about/
annual-report_2001preface.pdf (accessed May 20, 2005).
127. See United States v. Sargent County Water Res. Dist., 876 F.Supp. 1081, 1086 (D.N.D. 1992)
(holding that all Prairie Potholes in Eastern North Dakota which result from the same glacial lake, Lake
Agassiz, were not "adjacent" because the CWA could not possibly have intended such consequences,
though the CWA was intended to extend as broadly as possible. However, the court made no finding
that a present aquifer or groundwater connection to an adjacent navigable water does not allow for
Corps jurisdiction).
128. See Memorandum: Supreme Court Ruling Concerning CWA Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (January 19, 2001),
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidancelSWANCC/swancc-ogc.pdf (accessed March 18, 2005).
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isolated non-navigable waters were not jurisdictional only if the sole evi-
dence was the wetland's use as migratory bird habitat. However, when
other connections to interstate commerce can be articulated (i.e., habitat for
endangered species or water used to irrigate crops sold in interstate com-
merce) jurisdiction can be found. However, no cases interpreting the CWA
have arisen since SWANCC relying solely on interstate commerce connec-
tions such as habitat for endangered species or water used to irrigate crops
sold in interstate commerce. Though initially hostile to wetland protection,
the EPA and Corps under the George W. Bush administration elected not to
issue a new rule on federal regulatory jurisdiction over isolated wetlands.1
29
In the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, the CWA is developing the char-
acteristics of a "paper tiger."'' 30 To avoid such a fate, courts, while deter-
mining jurisdictional reach and utilizing the significant nexus test, must
keep the following ideas in mind: Congress intended the CWA to be com-
prehensive; Congress enacted the CWA for environmental protection not
navigation; the CWA mandates us to restore and maintain our waters, not
just slow their degradation; seemingly isolated waters often do effect the
quality of interstate waters; and court decisions must be founded on reason-
able and impartial scientific interpretation based on water quality, not poli-
tics.
VI. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF CONTROL OVER ISOLATED INTRASTATE
WETLANDS
In the wake of SWANCC, conservationists must find an effective means
of curtailing wetland loss and must have a legal justification for doing so.
The SWANCC Court would prefer the states create such law.' 3' This course
is treacherous, as history informs that the "race to the bottom" will quickly
follow. 1
32
129. EPA, Clean Water Act Definition of "Waters of the United States,"
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/SWANCC/ (accessed February 25, 2005); see also Ducks
Unlimited, The Clean Water Act and Protection of Isolated Wetlands,
http://www.ducks.org/conservation/ GovtCleanWaterAct.asp (accessed February 25, 2005).
130. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
131. SWANCC at 172-73. For a list of states with wetland regulations see State Wetland Protection
Statutes, State Wetland Managers Association, http://www.aswm.org/swp/states.htm; and The SWANCC
Decision: Implications for Wetlands and Waterfowl, Ducks Unlimited, 6-8 (Final Report 2001),
http://www.ducks.org/conservation/404_-report-l.pdf. Determining what states afford protection for
"isolated" wetlands is somewhat of a guessing game, as states regulate wetlands via different statutory
schemes.
132. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1211-12 (1977). The "race
to the bottom" theory has been criticized in its assumption that states are motivated to pursue economic
growth to the complete demise of environmental quality. Darly J. Levinson, Empire-Building Govern-
ment in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 946-47 (January 2005). Note, however, that even
four years after SWANCC only 17 of 50 states have "comprehensive" wetland regulation; lending cre-
dence to the validity of the "race to the bottom" theory. See also, The SWANCC Decision: Implications
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One effective legal justification could be had by inserting a clause into
the CWA specifically stating that CWA jurisdiction extends to the farthest
possible reach of Commerce Clause power; bolstered with a statutory
statement to the effect that intrastate non-adjacent wetlands "substantially
effect" interstate commerce. The effect here would be to override the
Court's justification for denying jurisdiction. Despite the environmentally
hostile political climate of the George W. Bush administration, wetlands
appear to hold a special place for the President; as such, a positive amend-
ment to the CWA may be realistic.'33
Alternatively, conservationists could look to alternate conduits of federal
power. One such conduit is the Property Clause. 134 Congress has the au-
thority to regulate activities occurring on non-federal lands if those activi-
ties affect the purpose for which a federal law was enacted. 35 "Under [the]
authority to protect the public land Congress' power must extend to regula-
tion of conduct on or off the public land that would threaten the designated
purpose of federal lands.' 36  If Congress possesses the power to protect
public land, a fortiori, Congress possesses the power to protect public
health and resources of public inurement such as clean water.1 37 The fed-
eral government has jurisdiction over non-federal land if it affects federal
land or interests.
In concert with well-settled law asserting federal authority over federal
interests -- is the Treaty Clause. 38  Justice Holmes settled the issue that
migratory birds fall within the purview of federal power and any state regu-
lation of migratory birds is subservient to that power.' 39 It follows that the
federal government may, and should, regulate resources appurtenant to mi-
gratory birds within its trust, including critical habitat. Voluminous prece-
dent exists regarding federal authority to protect critical habitat under the
for Wetlands and Waterfowl, Ducks Unlimited, 6-8 (Final Report 2001),
bttp://www.ducks.org/conservation /4)4_report_l .pdf (accessed April 4,205).
133. Ducks Unlimited, President Bush Signs Historic Wetlands Conservation Bill,
http://www.ducks.org/ news/BushSignsNAWCA. asp (accessed April 4, 2005).
134. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all need-
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States....").
135. See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (8 h Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007
(1982).
136. Id. at 1249.
137. See e.g. U.S. v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1982) (Federal government could take necessary
steps to protect federal property adjacent to miner's property from fire and pollution) (emphasis added);
US v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (upholding conviction and
regulation prohibiting duck hunting from a boat contained within a National Park over State owned
waters within the Park); US v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1033
(2000) (Minnesota ceded jurisdiction impliedly over Voyageurs National Park (VNP) via implied ces-
sion instead of express cession because state had participated in and supported the creation of the VPN
(as do states through their representatives support and participate in creation of tile CWA) and state
donated land to VPN, thus they ceded their rights to equal footing doctrine waters aid the Federal Gov-
erment had jurisdiction over the State waters; even though State expressly enacted a statute exerting
their jurisdiction over the waters).
138. 131 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 cl. 2. (The power to make treaties is delegated to the Executive).
139. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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Endangered Species Act. 40  If federal authority exists to protect critical
habitat, such as wetlands for endangered species, it is reasonable that such
authority also exists to protect critical habitat for migratory birds--even if
the habitat is merely a hydrologically-isolated intrastate wetland. In such a
case, the federal government could reasonably assert jurisdiction over criti-
cal habitat through interstate and international treaties.
Finally, ours is a nation where wildlife and water is held in the trust of
the public. 41 Considering the public cost of wetland destruction for private
gain, the Court has struck an uneven balance that must be leveled.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of this discussion, the Corps' authority still remains unclear.
This uncertainty reflects dissatisfaction by those interpreting the Supreme
Court's decision in SWANCC. Though the protections afforded to wetlands
under the CWA are by no means perfect, they are better than nothing.
42
The courts will likely continue to decide one battle at a time in the greater
campaign to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the nation's waters."'' 43 In utilizing the significant nexus test,
courts must keep the following ideas in mind: (1) Congress intended the
CWA to be comprehensive; (2) Congress enacted the CWA for environ-
mental protection and not for navigation; (3) the CWA mandates us to re-
store and maintain our waters, not just slow their degradation; (4) seem-
ingly isolated waters often do effect the quality of interstate waters; and (5)
court decisions must be founded on reasonable and impartial scientific in-
terpretation based on water quality, not politics. To do otherwise would be
to entrust the legacy of our Nation's waters to misinformation.
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9t, Cir. 1985).
141. John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Reparation Movement
Respecting Cultural Property (Part One), 27 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 349, 422 (Spring 2004);
Alyson C. Flournoy, Symposium: The Clean Water Act at Thirty: Progress, Problems, and Potential
Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A Program in Search of a Policy, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 607, 639 (Spring
2004).
142. See e.g. Flournoy, supra n. 141, at 607.
143. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132 (quoting Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. §
1251(1972)).
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